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Since the 1980s ASEAN has become an important avenue for FDI 
from the rest of the world. However, as the importance of FDI as a 
new source of economic growth engine has been recognized by 
many, especially other developing countries, other parts of the world 
are also becoming interested in attracting FDI to their countries. With 
the current intense competition in attracting FDI, inevitably, ASEAN 
has to create a better and more conducive business environment to 
enable it to retain the existing inflows as well as attract others to 
invest in Malaysia. One avenue that has not been intensively 
touched so far concerns the role of institutional quality in explaining 
the behavior of FDI inflows into ASEAN. The result of the analysis 
reveals the important and significant role of institutional quality in 
attracting FDI inflows into ASEAN. 
Field of Research: Foreign Direct Investment, Developing economies 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is strongly believed to have a major role to play in 
the economic development of emerging markets. This is particularly true for two 
reasons – lack of capital to finance domestic projects and lack of expertise to 
undertake the projects. As both advanced and developing countries are both 
showing growing interest in attracting FDI, the competition for attracting FDI 
inflow has become stiffer. Although FDI has existed since the According to 
UNCTAD (2006), the total world FDI inflows have grown tremendously from only 
US$ 55 billion in 1985 to US$ 1,511 billion in 1999-2000. However, it has started 
to decline since 2000. More importantly, the destination for the bulk of FDI flows 
is advanced countries and not developing countries. Moreover, the past decade 
remains identified with the increasing role of FDI in total capital flows (Alfaro, 
Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek, 2004, Table 1). For instance, FDI accounted 
for more than half of all private capital flows to developing countries in 1998 and 
this trend is consistent with the shifting emphasis among policy makers in 
developing countries from short-term capital to long-term capital (i.e. FDI)1.  
 
According to UNCTAD (2006), the total inflows of FDI into the region of East 
Asia, South Asia and South East Asia increased by 19% over the previous year 
and amounted to US$165 billion in 2005. While China, Hong Kong and 
Singapore are receiving the lion’s share of FDI in this region, it is surprising that 
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even Indonesia overtook Malaysia in FDI inflows for the year 2005. More 
specifically, in the case of Malaysia, based on the rankings designed by the 
United Nations, Malaysia was ranked fourth in the world for FDI in 1990. 
However, FDI flows into Malaysia have decreased gradually and steadily and 
Malaysia was ranked 62 in 2006. 
 
Table 1: The number of FDI projects into Asia-Pacific countries 
Country 2004 2005 % ∆ Country 2004 2005 % ∆
Malaysia  125 91 - 27.1 Singapore  172 149 - 13.4
Australia  139 102 - 26.6 Hong Kong 125 118 - 5.6
Japan  155 114 - 26.5 Thailand  123 117 - 4.9
China  1543 1186 - 23.1 Vietnam  159 168 5.7
Taiwan  84 67 - 20.2 South 
Korea 
103 113 9.7
India  684 561 - 18.0 Indonesia  59 75 27.1
Philippines  76 64 - 15.8 Pakistan 17 66 288.2
Source: LOCOmonitor (2005), retrieved from <www.ocoglobal.com> on January 
2008. 
 
Table 1 highlights that Malaysia’s FDI figures in 2004 were higher than in 2005, 
implying that that although the whole region generally benefitted from an increase 
in FDI, recently, Malaysia actually experienced a decrease in foreign investments 
and in fact recorded the highest reduction in the number of FDI projects among 
Asia-Pacific countries. Other ASEAN countries that also experienced negative 
growth include the Philippines (-15.8%), Singapore (-13.4%) and Thailand (-
4.9%). Conversely, Indonesia recorded the highest in ASEAN and the second 
highest in Asia-Pacific of FDI inflows with a figure of 27.1 percent, which is 
followed by Vietnam (5.7%). Nevertheless, the number of projects in Indonesia is 
still among the lowest compared to other countries. Even in the case of Malaysia, 
where a sharp reduction in the number of projects is observed, the number is 
higher than in Indonesia. Strikingly, Vietnam is currently leading in terms of the 
number of projects, surpassing Singapore and becoming a major threat, 
particularly to Malaysia and Thailand, for attracting low-cost-oriented FDI inflows.  
 
ASEAN faces significant challenges in its economic development program, 
especially in terms of funds to finance projects and/or technology development. It 
is generally recognized that foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows can offer part 
of the solution. The significant role of FDI is not only recognized by ASEAN as 
now other developing countries are also focusing on attracting FDI, which makes 
the competition to attract FDI become even more intense. Economists are 
continuously searching for new and attractive ways to persuade new FDI, while 
retaining the existing investment. This issue is particularly important as core 
ASEAN economies such as Malaysia and Thailand started to lose some of their 
cost advantages due to rapid wage increases and currency appreciation (Urata, 
1995). Therefore, firms in Japan and other advanced economies started to look 
at other East Asian countries such as new ASEAN members (i.e. Vietnam) as 
well as two emerging economic powers (India and China) as hosts for their 
investments.  Consequently, it is crucial for core ASEAN economies to search for 
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new instruments in which they have a comparative advantage over their 
competitors. 
 
A number of recent studies have emphasized the importance of policies as a 
mean to attract FDI. As mentioned in Kostevc, Redek and Sušjan (2007), one of 
the most important determinants of FDI flows to a country is the quality of its 
institutional framework, which can be classified into three basic institutions. 
These basic institutions, namely, private property rights, the law of contract and a 
strong but limited government will eventually shape the nature of the capitalist 
system. However, a study on quantifying the implications of institutions on foreign 
capital inflows has so far not been comprehensively analyzed, especially in the 
case of ASEAN. Nonetheless, it is a very pressing issue facing ASEAN. This idea 
was particularly stressed by Busse and Groizard (2008) who stated that any 
attempts by governments to attract FDI by offering special tax brackets will not 
result in the anticipated effect if the regulatory quality and liquidity remain low. 
The host country has to reform its fundamental framework for regulations so as to 
enhance the prospective growth-enhancing FDI to produce a positive outcome. 
Finally, looking at the large share of capital formation in poor countries 
(UNCTAD, 2004), Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007) also argue that the 
FDI-promoting effect of good institutions might be an important channel for their 
overall effect on growth and development. The stylized fact of institutional quality 
for ASEAN is discussed in greater detail in the next section. Concisely, this study, 
while asking what determines FDI inflows into ASEAN, will focus on the role of 
institutional quality in influencing the FDI flows into the region. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. After an overview on the importance of FDI 
for economic growth in developing countries in the next section, we analyze the 
factors that theoretically as well as empirically justify the importance of 
determining the inflow of FDI. Under this section, our focal point concerns the 
various institutional frameworks that could determine the FDI flow. In the fourth 
section, we formulate the empirical model used to estimate the implications of 
various institutional variables on FDI inflow. Subsequently, a discussion on 
estimation procedures will be offered. A more rigorous econometric analysis 
follows and the final section concludes this study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Stylized fact of Institutional Quality in ASEAN 
 
As mentioned in the introduction section, several studies such as Bénassy-Quéré 
et al. (2007) and Busse and Groizard (2008) have stressed the potential positive 
role of good institutional quality in economic development, in particular as an 
attraction to further persuade inflows of FDI. Thus, this section is devoted to 
highlighting the fact about institutional quality in ASEAN, and whether or not 
institutional quality can be another attraction for FDI inflows.  
 
With the large number of development projects in the developing countries, the 
competition to attract FDI has become stiffer over time. Apart from ASEAN-8 
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economies, several main competitors for FDI among developing economies have 
been added in Table 2 to identify the role of institutional quality pertaining to FDI 
attraction. From Table 2, by comparing the average value of each institutional 
quality element for two sub-periods (1996-2003 vs 2004-2008), countries like 
Thailand, Cambodia and the Philippines are experiencing declining institutional 
quality, of either the individual or the average sum of the elements of institutional 
quality. Other ASEAN economies are experiencing improvement in some 
elements but deterioration in other elements. Similar results are observed for 
China, Brazil and Argentina. Only India is experiencing an improvement in almost 
all elements, albeit minimal. Almost all the economies under consideration 
experienced a decline in their institutional quality over the period 1996 to 2008.   
 
Table 2: Institutional Quality for ASEAN and its Competitors 































Panel I: ASEAN-8 Economies 
Thailand 0.36 -0.31 0.24 -0.82 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.25 0.38 0.01 -0.22 -0.27 0.21 -0.15 -0.03 
Vietnam -1.43 -1.53 0.28 0.32 -0.46 -0.36 -0.57 -0.52 -0.5 -0.42 -0.66 -0.76 -0.56 -0.55 -0.01 
Singapore 0.07 -0.26 1.17 1.23 2.25 2.32 1.87 1.83 1.54 1.75 2.25 2.24 1.53 1.52 1.53 
Philippines 0.19 -0.08 -0.64 -1.25 -0.18 -0.10 0.16 -0.12 -0.32 -0.50 -0.45 -0.71 -0.21 -0.46 -0.13 
Malaysia  -0.33 -0.42 0.36 0.29 0.81 1.05 0.55 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.44 0.29 0.39 0.37 0.38 
Laos -1.36 -1.65 -0.26 -0.18 -0.65 -0.88 -1.36 -1.18 -1.22 -1.00 -0.94 -1.13 -0.97 -1.01 -0.02 
Indonesia  -0.69 -0.20 -1.50 -1.21 -0.49 -0.38 -0.31 -0.39 -0.76 -0.74 -0.95 -0.77 -0.79 -0.62 -0.09 
Cambodia -0.84 -0.89 -0.95 -0.43 -0.84 -0.87 -0.21 -0.52 -1.12 -1.15 1.02 -1.13 -0.49 -0.84 -0.18 
Panel II: Main recipients of FDI among developing countries 
India  0.28 0.43 -0.94 -0.90 -0.15 -0.04 -0.24 -0.24 0.18 0.14 -0.38 -0.33 -0.21 -0.16 -0.03 
China  -1.49 -1.62 -0.19 -0.26 -0.07 0.06 -0.26 -0.26 -0.36 -0.41 -0.28 -0.57 -0.44 -0.51 -0.04 
Brazil 0.27 0.46 -0.02 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 0.29 0.05 -0.27 -0.38 0.02 -0.11 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
Argentina 0.26 0.32 -0.20 -0.03 0.00 -0.13 -0.00 -0.70 -0.28 -0.60 -0.33 -0.40 -0.09 -0.26 -0.09 
Note: VA = voice and accountability; PS = political stability (and absence of violence); GE = 
government effectiveness; RQ = regulatory quality; RL =  rule of law; CC = control of corruption.  
Source: World Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2009b). 
 
As the changes in the institutional quality among developing economies are not 
that significant, the most important point to focus on is the average institutional 
quality for the period from 1996 to 2008. On average, with the exception of 
Malaysia and Singapore, all economies are experiencing low institutional quality. 
Only Cambodia has significantly low institutional quality. The rest of the ASEAN 
members tend to have a similar level of institutional quality relative to India, 
China, Brazil and Argentina2. In other words, if ASEAN economies could further 
improve their level of institutional quality, combined with the regional cooperation 
of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN could win the competition to 
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Review of determinant of FDI – the role of Institutions 
 
The role of institutions, which constitutes the effectiveness of property rights, 
economic freedom, a regulatory system (i.e. tax system, corruption, 
transparency) and bureaucracy framework matter in explaining economic growth. 
Among the earliest attempts to address this relationship is Rodrik (1999). In 
searching for the answer of ‘where did all the growth go’, Rodrik (1999) added 
social conflict as one of the explanatory variables. As part of the conclusion, 
Rodrik (1999) confirms that the sharp drop in growth after 1975 can be partly 
explained by a divided society3 and weak institutions4. Therefore, what actually 
matters are the rules of the game in a society, as defined by prevailing explicit 
and implicit behavioral norms and their ability to create appropriate incentives for 
desirable economic behavior (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2003). Whether or not 
bi-directional causality exists between income growth and institutions is still a 
matter of debate. Studies like Kaufmann and Kray (2008) and Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2004), while providing support that institutions can 
stimulate economic growth, do not find evidence for reverse causality. However, 
theoretically, Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) demonstrate that there could be a 
bi-directional causality running between income growth and institutions. Income 
growth requires good institutions, whereas good institutions will result in higher 
income growth.  
  
Consequently, as foreign direct investment is also well-recognized as one major 
determinant of income growth, there is growing interest regarding the link 
between institutions and FDI inflows. Daniele and Marani (2006) discuss three 
potential channels through which institutions may affect FDI inflows. First, the 
presence of good institutions tends to improve factor productivity and 
subsequently stimulates investments, regardless of whether they are domestic or 
external. Second, good institutions will result in a reduction in investment related 
transaction costs (i.e. corruption-related costs). Finally, by definition, FDI 
generally involves high sunk costs. Therefore, with good institutions (i.e. proper 
property rights enforcement and effective legal systems) will give more security to 
multinational firms.  
 
Recently, there have been many studies on the relationship of FDI-institutions 
such as Knack and Keefer (1995), Knack and Keefer (1997), Clarke (2001), 
Daniele and Marani (2006), Busse and Groizard (2008), Kostevc et al. (2007), 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) and Ghosh (2007). Knack and Keefer (1995) used 
two measures of institutional quality, which represent the security of property 
rights and contract rights, namely, risk of expropriation and the rule of law. These 
two proxies are available from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Knack and Keefer (1997) add another emphasis regarding the importance of 
institutions in economic development by stating that all concepts of social capital 
have in common the idea that ‘trust’ and ‘norms’ of civic cooperation are essential 
to well-functioning societies, and, subsequently, to the economic progress of 
those societies. Empirically, Knack and Keefer (1997) find evidence to support 
the concept that social capital, which is proxied by trust and civic cooperation, 
has a significant impact on aggregate economic activity. Meanwhile, Clarke 
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(2001) focuses on the role of institutions on a specific variable, namely, 
technological deepening in developing countries. By using similar proxies for 
institutional quality as those used in Knack and Keefer (1995), while utilizing R&D 
expenditure (as % of GDP) as a proxy for technological deepening, regardless of 
the level of income, institutional quality was found to have a positive implication 
on technological deepening. In addition, Clarke (2001) also found that 
institutional quality has a positive correlation with FDI, which is another source of 
technological deepening. Hence, indirectly, Clarke (2001) establishes a positive 
association between FDI and institutional quality and, ultimately, the positive 
implication of good institutional quality on technology upgrading.  
 
Busse and Groizard (2008) utilize the data provided by Doing Business5. Out of 
seven, five indicators that are strongly related to inflow of FDI, are chosen, 
namely, starting a business, labor market regulations, contract regulations, 
creditor rights and insolvency regulations. By using factor loadings in principal 
components analysis as weights, these indicators were then transformed into a 
single or overall index of regulations. Limiting the analysis to only the top 20 or 30 
percent most regulated countries, Busse and Groizard (2008) found that 
countries with high regulation standards will, generally, benefit less from the 
inflow of FDI. Therefore, they suggest that governments have, in the first place, 
to improve the regulatory quality in the home country before the benefit from 
openness to foreign capital (i.e. in the form of FDI) can be derived. Similar to 
Busse and Groizard (2008), Daniele and Marani (2006) develop ‘institutional 
efficiency’ based on seven indicators developed by Kaufman and Kraay (2005) 
by using the same approach, namely, the principal component analysis. Using 
MENA countries as a sample, Daniele and Marani (2006) found that besides 
small local market size, governance and institutions demonstrate a strong effect 
on FDI inward, suggesting that institutions and legal reform are fundamental 
steps to improve the attractiveness of MENA in terms of FDI. Considering the 
possibility of the high correlation of GDP per capita and institutions might lead to 
a positive impact of institutions on FDI, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) attempt to 
investigate the implication of institutions on FDI inflow by controlling for GDP per 
capita. By introducing another institutional indicator called the Institutional 
Profiles, developed by the French Ministry of Finance, Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2007) found that institutions matter independently of GDP per capita and, 
accordingly, conclude that public efficiency (i.e. tax systems, easiness to create a 
company, lack of corruption, transparency, contract law, security of property 
rights, efficiency of justice and prudential standards), in a broad sense, is a major 
determinant of inward FDI. Meanwhile, in his attempt to establish and investigate 
the correlations between trade openness and FDI liabilities, Ghosh (2007) adds 
the measure of institutional quality, essentially as a robustness check on these 
correlations. Despite playing a mere role as a controller, the results are worth 
mentioning. Ghosh (2007) argues that although there is evidence to support the 
positive role of institutional quality, it is not in a consistent or robust manner. In 
other words, the results are not consistent when different specifications are used, 
leading to a difficulty in interpreting whether institutions matter for FDI. Finally, 
Kostevc et al. (2007) investigate the same issue in transition economies and the 
results show that institutional quality significantly influenced the level of FDI in 
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those economies under consideration, as well as budget deficit, insider 
privatization and labor cost.  
 
Despite relatively ample evidence suggesting the positive effect of institutions on 
inflow of FDI, most of the previous studies are mainly panel analysis. This is not 
surprising as the information about institutional quality was only recently 
gathered. Therefore, this study attempts to focus on the ASEAN region, which 
recently experienced a large inflow of FDI6.  
 
3. Model Specification 
 
In order to assess the effect of institutions on inflows of FDI into ASEAN, we 
conduct a regression analysis.  In setting up the FDI equation, we use the basic 
argument on the motivation of FDI inflows to other countries, which are market-
seeking as well as efficiency-seeking, or simply7: 
 
( )ESVMSVfFDI ,=                    (1) 
 
Where MSV stands for market-seeking variables and ESV denotes efficiency-
seeking variables. As for the proxies, we use gross domestic product (GDP) and 
institutional quality (INS) as proxies for MSV while utilizing education expenditure 
as a proxy for human capital development (HCD), relative wage (RW) and trade 
ratio (TRADE) as proxies for ESV. The use of GDP as a proxy for market size is 
intuitively clear and commonly used in the literature. In addition, as argued by 
many studies such as Wei (2000) and Daude and Stein (2007), market 
uncertainty (e.g. low and unpredictable enforcement of law, corruption and 
property right) has important negative effects on FDI8. Hence, expanding the 
above MSV and ESV into their respective proxies, we get the following equation: 
 
),,,,( TRADERWHCDGDPINSfFDI =        (2) 
 
where FDI is foreign direct investment, INS is institutional quality, GDP is gross 
domestic product, HCD is human capital development in the host economy and 
RW is relative wage. As a high value represents good institution, it is anticipated 
that there will be a positive association between INS and FDI. Meanwhile, GDP is 
generally added as a proxy for the domestic market. Large markets (and 
sometimes rapidly growing markets) can attract FDI (Holland, Benacek, Gronicki 
and Sass, 2000). Although these variables are not usually built into a formal 
theoretical model, the idea is intuitively straightforward. A larger economy affords 
more opportunities to foreign investors, as there are physically more firms and 
business projects in which one can invest. The motive for investment can stem 
from the combination of economies of scale and trade barriers (Holland et al., 
2000). Therefore, GDP is hypothesized as having a positive association with FDI 
inflows.  
 
In connection with the labor market, labor quality and labor cost have been two 
main determinants of FDI inflows. On the one hand, labor quality might be more 
important than cheap labor. For example, firms that produce differentiated goods 
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and are in search of new markets need local staff that will be able to operate the 
production technology used in the source country (Jaumotte, 2004). Hence, 
although human capital development and FDI are among the key drivers of 
growth in developed and developing countries and they individually affect growth, 
they might also reinforce each other through complementary effects. In general, 
enhanced HCD increases incoming FDI by making the investment climate 
attractive for foreign investors. This is done through the direct effect of the 
upgraded skill level of the workforce, as well as via indirect effects such as 
improved socio-political stability and health (Miyamoto, 2003). On the other hand, 
part of the FDI inflows, particularly in developing countries, is motivated by cheap 
labor costs and a reduction of production costs. This so-called “vertical FDI” 
consists in relocating the labor-intensive stages of the production process to the 
developing country in order to benefit from lower labor costs (Jaumotte, 2004). 
Accordingly, the empirical evidence on the effect of wage costs is somewhat 
mixed, depending on the type of FDI considered, while some evidence of a 
positive effect of education on FDI is found in several studies. As there is no 
labor cost data for developing countries available over a long period, one way to 
measure relative wage rates is by using the procedure introduced by Bende-
Nabende et al. (2001). In the computation of relative wage rates, the real 
manufacturing earnings per employee for the country under study have been 
converted into US dollars and compared with those for China over the period 
under study as shown below9. Given the unavailability of the real manufacturing 
earnings, we proceed with GDP per labor as a proxy for local wage rates, which 
we denote with WL. If WC represents China’s wage rates, ERL stands for the 
local exchange rate (local currency per 1 US dollar), ERC denotes the exchange 
rate for China (Reminbi per 1 US dollar), and subscript t denotes the year under 








RW =                                                                                   (3) 
 
Another important determinant of FDI could be the openness to trade. Openness 
to trade is normally measured as the ratio of trade (imports plus exports) to GDP. 
In relation to FDI inflows, theoretically, we cannot generalize the impact as it 
could differ according to the type of FDI. FDI inflows will be higher in the case of 
tariff-jumping FDI to highly restrictive countries while not necessarily in the case 
of vertical FDI. However, vertical FDI could also be strongly invited to inflow if 
there is less restriction to export, or to be precise, to re-export to the home 
country or other third countries. Nevertheless, it is generally expected that the 
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4. Estimation Procedure and Data Collection 
 
Considering the small number of time series data, this study proceeds by using 
panel data, pooling 8 members of ASEAN10 for the period 1996 - 2008. The 








              (4) 
 
where i implies regions and t the time periods. The fix effects method implies that 
when the hypothesis of global homogeneity is rejected for panel data, the OLS 
common coefficient estimator is inconsistent. One of the most common options 
used in the literature is to introduce the differences among countries. This 
inclusion reacts as a control variable. The most obvious generalization of the 
model with intercept and constant slope parameters for panel data is to introduce 
dummy variables to incorporate the effects of omitted variables that are specified 
to the individual units of cross-section. These dummy variables remain constant 
during the time and the effects that are specified at each time period, but are 
similar through the different cross-section units. In addition, we could also test the 
existence of time effect by controlling the time dimension.  
 
This study employs annual data spanning from 1996 to 2008, mainly due to the 
fact that the data for institutional quality only available from 1996 onwards. The 
data for FDI, GDP and HCD are collected from World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2009a). The data set on institutional quality11 indicators are 
employed from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs). Six 
WGIs are used to measure the overall institutional environment, namely12: (1) 
voice and accountability (VA) which measures the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, association, and the press, (2) political stability and absence of 
violence (PS), which represents the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism, (3) 
government effectiveness (GE), which reflects the quality of public services, the 
capacity of the civil service and its independence from political pressure; the 
quality of policy formulation, (4) regulatory quality (RQ)  demonstrates the ability 
of the government to provide sound policies and regulations that enable and 
promote private sector development, (5) rule of law (RL) highlights the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, including the 
quality of property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the risk of crime, 
and (6) control of corruption (CC), which indicate the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as elite "capture" of the state.  
 
5. Results and discussions 
 
We start our analysis by investigating the impact of INS on FDI. Here, INS is 
proxied by the sum of the WGIs. It is important to note here that the value for 
each of the WGIs ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. As for consistency of 
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measurement where we want to transform all variables into logarithmic form, we 
rescale the indicators by adding 3 to each value. This will ensure that we end up 
with a positive value for all WGIs, or at least the value will not be zero.  By 
summing all the WGIs, we get the aggregate data of INS.  
 
   Table 3: Panel data estimation (Dep. Var. = lnFDI) 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
lnINS 0.2583** 0.0147 
lnGDP 1.2844** 0.3441 
lnHCD 0.1151** 0.0499 
lnRW - 1.0046** - 0.2985 
lnTRADE 0.6427** 0.1748 
   
Adjusted-R2 = 0.4236 S.E. of Reg. = 0.0881 
F-redundant test: 
Cross-F                         





Cross-random             




Note: Asterisk ** denotes significant at least at 10 %.  
 
In line with the general belief that ASEAN economies are heterogeneous in many 
aspects such as culture, religion, level of economic development and so forth, we 
found that the results after controlling for country specific effect fared better. 
Interestingly, when we test for time effect, which controls for the year-to-year 
effect the outcome is less favorable. However, when we group the years into two 
classes, namely, 1996-2001 and 2002-2007, the adjusted-R2 and standard errors 
of regression tend to suggest that this would be the better specification13. Finally, 
the same statistics suggest that the best model would be the one that controls for 
both, cross-effect as well as selective time-effect.  
 
In addition, we also test the panel fixed effect model with other competing models 
such as pooled OLS and the panel random effect model. The results of two F-
redundant tests, cross-F and period-F demonstrate the fact that relative to the 
pooled model, the panel fixed effect model is the better model. Similar results 
prevail when we test against the panel random effect model.  The results of the 
Hausman tests, which are cross-random and period-random, reveal that the 
panel random effect model cannot outperform the panel fixed effect model. With 
this in mind, Table 3 presents the results from the panel fixed effect model. 
 
The result supports the idea that institutional quality could be the solution for the 
slowing pattern of FDI inflows into the region. From Table 3, we can see that the 
impact of INS is not only positive but highly significant. Nevertheless, the impact 
of INS is the second lowest after literacy rate. This is not too surprising as the 
level of institutional quality between ASEAN economies and the world’s largest 
recipient of FDI currently, China, is not too different. In other words, there is room 
for ASEAN to improve institutional quality as an attraction for FDI inflow into 
ASEAN. Market size remains the main determinant of FDI inflows. This could be 
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explained by the fact that although ASEAN as a whole is not as populous as 
China, the purchasing power of ASEAN is actually higher than China and, 
therefore, could serve as a good avenue for high quality products of multinational 
corporations. The literacy rate seems to be the least influential factor. Not too 
surprising because the literacy rate in China (and also India, which is the second 
largest recipient of FDI) are improving over time. It can also be explained by the 
fact that ASEAN is not yet successfully attracting high-tech oriented FDI into the 
region. Thus, the bulk of FDI into the region could be the efficiency-seeking type 
of FDI targeting the low cost of labor. In line with the lowest impact of HCD, we 
could see the high negative impact of RW on FDI. These two points could be 
complementing each other, demonstrating the failure of ASEAN in attracting 
high-tech multinational corporations. This issue is further exacerbated by the fact 
that India has a large domestic market as well as a large number of high-skilled 
workers. Finally, the impact of trade is positive and significant, implying that 




This study attempts to investigate the impact of institutional quality on FDI inflows 
into ASEAN for the period from 1996 to 2008. We found an indication that 
improving the institutional quality is also crucial as part of future policy strategy to 
further attract new FDI to inflows into the region. The low impact of institutional 
quality does indeed suggest that ASEAN countries are yet to embark seriously on 
this issue and results could be different in the future. This is because, institutional 
quality could also serve as the cost of doing business and improvement would 




1. For example, Malaysia has promoted Labuan as an offshore financial center as part of the 
effort to attract short-term capital but after the 1997 economic crisis no aggressive promotional 
effort has been observed. In other words, it is commonly perceived that after the crisis short-term 
capital is not loyal and does not suit the country’s development program. As mentioned in Alfaro 
et al. (2004), another reason for this shift to FDI is because of the 1980s debt crisis that plunged 
the developing countries into turmoil. 
2. While not denying that all these economies are large in size and size by itself could exert a 
strong influence on FDI from developed nations to go into these economies, as institutional 
quality represents another type of cost of production, we do believe that good institutional quality 
still matters for FDI inflows. 
3. Proxied by inequality and ethnic fragmentation. 
4. Proxied by the quality of governmental institutions, rule of law, democratic rights and social 
safety nets. 
5. See www.doingbusiness.org, which is provided by the World Bank. 
6. Other interesting studies dealing with this issue include Démurger, Sachs, Woo, Bao, Chang, 
and Mellinger (2002), Dollar and Kraay (2003), Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000), 
Smarzynska and Wei (2000), Stein and Daude (2001) and Wei (1997, 2000).  
7. Another possible explanation for the motivation of FDI inflows is resource-seeking. However, 
due to the difficulty in obtaining data on the natural resources we decided not to include this factor 
in our model specification. Although the data on the amount of some productions of natural 
resources is available, the pressing issue in the case of ASEAN, particularly Malaysia, is the 
depletion of natural resources. Therefore, the level of reserve of natural resources could be more 
representative than the production of it. On this ground, we decided not to include the factor in 
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this paper but it will be considered in our next paper on the same issue. The motivation to 
proceed with this idea in our next paper is due to Kostevc et al. (2007). Kostevc et al. (2007) 
reveal that the quality of the institutional environment sometimes plays a secondary role, coming 
after the availability of abundant natural resources (e.g., fossil fuel). 
8. Although this variable can be classified under government policy, to conserve space, we treat 
INS as one market indicator. 
9. China is chosen because: (i) it is a neighboring country of the countries under study, and (ii) it 
has been the biggest competitor (locator and/or relocator of production) for FDI inflows.  
10. Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam. 
Brunei, Myanmar and Timor Leste are omitted due to data unavailability. 
11. Although the data taken from the World Bank and the word ‘governance’ is dominant, as 
argued by Kaufmann and Kraay (2008, p. 3) “Despite the long provenance of the concept, no 
strong consensus has formed around a single definition of governance or institutional quality”. For 
the same reason, throughout this article the terms institutional quality will be used intensively but 
the meaning could be interchangeably the same as governance and institutions, if somewhat 
imprecisely. 
12. The explanation on each indicator is taken directly and fully from Kauffman, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2009). The data can be downloaded freely from www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. 
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